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ABSTRACT 
The significance of the automobile industry as viewed by the Beijing government is 
crystally clear in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996 - 2000) for the People's Republic of 
China that auto making was selected as one of the four pillar industries. Nationwide 
focus in the automobile industry has once been the development of passenger cars. 
It was projected that by year 2000 by the Ministry of Machinery Industry, the sales 
of passenger car would be 1 million. Included in the state's strategic development of 
the passenger car segment, there are currently eight major car makers. 
However, China's passenger car industry is plagued by inefficiencies. There are a lot 
of hindering factors in the development of the passenger car industry, to name a 
few, the discouraging demand, the pressure on reducing industry entry barriers in 
order for China to resume membership in the World Trade Organization, the 
neglected component sector and the disorder aftermarket. 
To the foreign investors, the China passenger car market projected a very optimistic 
picture in the long run. Judging on the ground of costs, the attractiveness of China 
in terms of cost factors, appears to be positive but does not apply to most in the 
industry as they are not achieving economies of scale. Competition is head to head 
in view of the discouraging demand and the consideration of the China government, 
which makes all the policies, also casts reasons for caution. 
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In view of the above, possible areas that the Beijing government could consider to 
promote her value to the passenger car foreign investors while still protecting her 
infant passenger industry. First, the facilitation of consolidation so that some key 
players can enjoy the economies of scale, aligning with Beijing's plan to establishing 
three to four internationally competitive automotive groups by 2010. Second, the 
promotion of long-term market hype, promoting the attractiveness of the China 
passenger car market and keep the key stakeholders in the picture. Third, 
continuously building faith in the Beijing Government, in particular promoting 
stability that Jiang Zamen has everything under control after the passing away of 
Deng, and the putting of importance on key personnel linked to the industry as seen 
by the foreign investors such as Zhu Ronji. Fourth, keep the joint-venture scheme 
such that foreign investors are kept in the loop, and they will have to "prosper and 
die together" with the local partners. 
To conclude, there is still a long way for the passenger car industry in China to go. 
The Beijing government needs to orchestrate the industry's growth to prevent it 
from running off track. 
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Automobile Industry in China 
Historically, China's automotive industry developed slowly after the foundation of the 
People's Republic in 1949, within a typical centrally-planned economy largely copied 
from the Soviet model and excluding herself from the world's developments on all 
fronts, including the automotive industry. The open-door policy in the late 1970s by 
Deng Xiaoping, triggered economic reform experiments. The key milestone for China's 
automotive industry was the establishment of Shanghai-Volkswagen in 1984. Following 
this German pioneer, other Western auto-makers entered, such as Chrysler, Peugeot, 
Citroen, Daihatsu, Suzuki, Iveco (Fiat), Audi, Subaru, Renault, Mercedes-Benz, GM and 
Ford. 
The significance of the industry as viewed by the Beijing government is crystally clear in 
the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996 - 2000) for the People's Republic of China that auto 
making was selected as one of the four pillar industries. The automobile industrial 
policy published in 1994 officially confirmed the Chinese government's strong 
commitment to a major development of its automobile industry. The Chinese 
government has set on a course to develop a strong, independent local automotive 
industry using Western technology and capital. In order to achieve the strategic targets 
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for the passenger car sector the government issued an industrial policy document for 
the automotive sector in 1994, specifying detailed government targets and regulations 
on the industrial structure. (Please refer to the Appendix for the main points.) 
Passenger Car 
Believing that "modern economy cannot exist without a powerful automobile 
industry"1, Chinese officials in the Ministry of Machinery Industry have projected more 
than RMB 120 billion (or more than US$ 15 billion) would be invested in the industry in 
China before year 2000. 
Nationwide focus in the automobile industry has once been the development of 
passenger cars. It was projected that by year 2000 by the Ministry of Machinery 
Industry, the sales of passenger car would be 1 million. Included in the state's strategic 
development of the passenger car segment, there are currently eight major car makers 
who are supported by the state for further development. 
A key element of the government's plan is the development of a "family car" to meet 
the local market demand. The plan was the centerpiece of the government's five-year 
economic plan conference in November 1994. The announcement attracted almost all of 
the world's major car makers. Each presented plans for cars and offered technical 
assistance and financial support for the venture. The Chinese officials listened to each 
presentation carefully, took copies of the plans and returned to their offices. Since then, 
the industry has heard little or nothing about the family car and many assumed that the 
scheme was evaporated in the bureaucratic ether. The attention also shifted to industrial 
1 The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 23 January, 1996 
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use car. Yet, it seems work on the vehicle has begun and production is scheduled to 
start by the end of the decade. Initial Chinese specifications were for an RMB 64,000 
medium-sized car with air conditioning and an engine size between 600cc and lOOOcc. 
More recent reports suggest it needs to cost RMB 40,000 - 56,000 and that the 
specification is more like one for very small Japanese cars made in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Whichever is correct, the car is intended to use state-of-the-art technology and allow the 
Chinese industry greater independence. 
Outlook 
Judging on the economic environment, when the central government adopted a tight 
money policy since 1993, China's passenger car industry has been operating in a weak 
market. The sales of passenger cars in 1995 is only 0.45 million2, which is far below the 
projected trend. 
Currently, China's passenger car industry is plagued by inefficiencies. The industry is 
characterized by scatteredness, disorderly production, lack of division of labor, lack of 
development capability and poor efficiency. If these remain unchanged, it has been 
commented that the very existence of the industry would be threatened in face of the 
fierce competition at home and abroad. 
Once commented by the Nobel laureate, Milton Friedman, that it may only take China 
30 years to accomplish what it took the western countries 200 years to achieve, there is 
still a long way for the passenger car industry in China to go. The automobile industry, 
as the pillar, will no doubt prove invaluable in stimulating other sectors, but its 
2 China Daily - Business Weekly, 22 - 28 September, 1996 
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development demands concerted efforts from different departments and regions. Surely 
the Beijing government needs to orchestrate the industry's growth to prevent it from 
running off track. 
Research Objectives 
Focusing on the passenger car industry, the paper would like to pursue the following 
objectives :-
1. To explore the recent development of the passenger car industry in China; 
2. To comprehend the current hindering factors to the development of the 
passenger car industry; 
3. To assess the globalization potential of China for the passenger car industry; 
4. To appreciate the possible contribution of China to the foreign investors while 
they are planning their global strategies; 
5. To define the key areas for consideration for the Beijing government to formulate 




The following steps will be taken : 
1 . Assess Globalization Potential of China's Passenger Car Industry 
The globalization potential of China for the passenger car industry will be assessed. The 
industry globalization drivers - market, cost, government, competitive - will be 
evaluated following the "Framework for Global Strategy" Mr. George S. Yip advocates3 • 
2 . Assess Value of China to the Foreign Investors 
Evaluate the possible contribution of China to the passenger car making foreign 
investors when they are planning their global strategies. 
3. Assess How China Can Make Use of The Situation 
Assess how China can make best use of the situation and identify areas for 
consideration to map out a strategy to develop the pillar industry. 
3 George S. Yip. Total Global Strategy. Prentice Hall, 1992. 
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The following research methods will be used : 
L Secondary Research 
The paper depends mainly on secondary information from various sources which 
include statistical yearbooks, books, research results, journals. Newspapers clippings 
will also be collected to substantiate the analysis. 
2. Primary Research 
In order to get more first-hand information from the passenger car industry in China, 
interviews (in person or telephone) would be arranged. The intended interviewees will 




In general, related literature usually focus on two areas: the first area is the analysis of 
the current situation of the eight key passenger car players while the second area is the 
analysis of the overall passenger car market or industry situation. 
The Current Passenger Car Market Players 
The Economist Intelligence Unit has been publishing periodicals on the Motor Business 
in Asia-Pacific on a quarterly basis. The passenger car industry of China has often been 
a topic in the periodical. The eight major passenger car players are often referred to as 
the "Big Three", "Little Three", and "Mini Two". (Table 1) , 
The Big Three are 
• Shanghai Automotive Industry / Volkswagen; 
• First Auto Works / Volkswagen; and 
• Dong Feng Motor / Citroen. 
The "Little Three" are 
• Beijing Automotive Industry / Chrysler; 
• Tianjin Automotive Industry / Daihatsu; and 
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• Guangzhou Automotive Industry / Peugeot. 
The "Mini Two" are 
• Chongqing Chang'an / Suzuki; and 
• Guizhou Aerospace / Subaru. 
Table 1. Profile of the leading passenger car makers in China 
Company Location Product Nature of Foreign partner 
cooperation/ Year 
Shanghai Shanghai Santana Joint Venture Volkswagen 
Automotive (Buick -1999) / 1984 (GM under 
Industry negotiation) 
First Auto Changchun Audi, Jetta Joint Venture Volkswagen 
Works / 1987 (Daewoo planned) 
Dong Feng Wuhan Citroen ZX Joint Venture Citroen 
Motor (Civic 1999) /1994 (Honda under 
negotiation) 
Beijing Beijing Cherokee Joint Venture Chrysler 
Automotive / 1984 
Industry 
Tianjin Tianjin Charade Technology Daihatsu 
Automotive cooperation 
/ 1986 
Corolla Joint Venture (Toyoto cars 
(engines planned) 
Guangzhou Guangzhou Peugeot Joint Venture Peugeot ^ 
Automotive (Corsa/Astra / 1987 (Opel under 
Industry 1999) negotiation) 
Chongqing Chongqing Alto joint Venture Suzuki 
Chang'an 
Guizhou Anshun Skylark Technology Subaru 
Aerospace cooperation 
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Table 2. Capacity and output of the major JV vehicle producers 
Compjany Product Foreign Actual Production Planned 
partner Total Capacity Production 
Production (1995) Capacity 
(1995) (2000) 
Shanghai Santana Volkswagen 160,000 200,000 300,000 
Automotive 
Industry 
Buick GM 100,000 
First Auto Audi/Jetta Volkswagen 40,000 150,000 200,000 
Works 
Daewoo 300,000 
Dong Feng Citroen ZX Citroen 4,000 150,000 300,000 
Motor 
Beijing Cherokee Chrysler 80,000 150,000 150,000 
Automotive 
Industry 
Tianjin Charade Daihatsu 65,000 150,000 300,000 
Automotive 
Guangzhou Peugeot Peugeot 8,000 50,000 150,000 
Automotive 
Industry 
Chongqing Alto Suzuki 13,000 50,000 350,000 
Chang'an 
Guizhou Skylark Subaru 8,600 10,000 150,000 
Aerospace 
Note: many auto makers over-estimate their capacity for year 2000 in order to secure 
government support. 
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Table 3. Unit car sales by car manufacturers, 1991 - 96 
Company Product 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ~ 1 9 9 6 
Shanghai Automotive Santana 33,85 59,315100,030115,295 159,765114,448 
Industry 5 
First Auto Works Audi 0“15 ,031 17 ,67820 ,325 19,395 10,074 
Group 
First Auto Works - Jetta 0 N/A 12,506 7,630 19,916 13,019 
Volkswagen 
Dong Feng Motor Citroen ZX 0 786 4,537 8,342 3,965 1,213 
Beijing Automotive Cherokee 12,01 12,793 13,723 13,986 25,921 16,478 
Industry 0 
Tianjin Automotive Charade 11,27 29,986 39,872 54,800 65,238 49,501 
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Guangzhou Peugeot 9 ,03615 ,527 14,012 4,805 6,608 1,755 
Automotive Industry 
Chongqing Chang'an Alto 225 5,566 ~10,423 9,873 6,859 3,248 
Guizhou Aerospace Skylark N/A N/A N/A 1,500 8,622 611 
Clearly Shanghai-Volkswagen's Santana has been the market leader for years, and has 
won half of the market in 1995. (Table 4) Shanghai-Volkswagen, the first car making 
joint venture in China, was established in 1984, and currently is the only car maker in 
China which has reached a profitable production scale. (Table 2). San tana's success is 
attributable to its good brand name awareness, its competitive price - due to high local 
content, surpassing 90% by the end of 1995, and an appropriate production scale - and 
its after-sales service which is the most developed in China. And above all, Shanghai's 
presence in the central government. 
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Table 4. Market share of passenger cars made in China, 1992 - 95 
Company Product ]""“1992 1993 ~1994 1995 
% % % % 
Shanghai Automotive Santana 40 20 44.80 46.60 51.04 
Industry 
First Auto Works Audi 930 8^0 8^00 6.20 
Group 
First Auto Works - Jetta 480 5^60 3AO 6.30 
Volkswagen 
Dong Feng Motor Citroen ZX 040 2AG 333 1.37 
Beijing Automotive Cherokee 12.30 6^00 5^65 8.30 
Industry 
Tianjin Automotive Charade 19.20 21.40 23.60 20.85 
Guangzhou Peugeot 10.00 7^20 Z00 1.97 
Automotive Industry 
Chongqing Chang'an Alto 3^50 470 770 3.68 
Guizhou Aerospace Skylark N / A 0.01 0.02 0.29 
The Tianjin Charade, produced in collaboration with Daihatsu, has also performed quite 
well in recent years, although there was a downturn in 1995. As an economical model 
with a 900cc engine and an affordable price. Charade has been very successful in the 
segment of taxi companies and private buyers. However, the Charade (together with 
Suzuki's Alto) has been confronted with some criticism because of quality problems and 
a rejection by several major cities in recent years. The first major attack came from 
Shanghai in 1995, when the city authorities decided that an economic car, like Charade 
or Alto, was not allowed to form part of the city's taxi fleet. To aggravate the situation, 
several other cities also announced a similar regulation against Charade. The second 
shock was received from its close neighbor Beijing, earlier in 1996, when certain types of 
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vehicles were forbidden to be driven in downtown areas on certain days of the week. 
Charade was on the victim list. Many new buyers in Beijing, who had just paid the 
money but not yet received delivery, rushed to the sales agents, asking for the money 
back. 
The most notable loser is Guangzhou Peugeot. Established in 1985, the joint venture has 
survived for 11 years. The company, however, has been confronted with increasing 
difficulties, with its sales and production continuously decreasing year by year, 
especially since the start of the 1990s. Peugeot's market share dropped dramatically 
from 10% in 1992 to only 1.97% in 1995. In the period January-July 1996 Peugeot's total 
sales decreased by 48% as compared with the figure for the same period of 1995. (Table 
3). Recently, the foreign partner withdrew from the joint venture already. 
Jetta has experienced some sales fluctuation in recent years, but its performance in 1995 
presented a strong recovery. The model won a good reputation among consumers for 
its reliability and quality, and reasonable price in recent years, Cherokee suffered a 
major downturn in 1993 but recovered and started an upturn in 1995 and through the 
first half of 1996. Citroen was undergoing a transition period when the new assembly 
facilities located in Wuhan started operation in September 1995 in addition to the 
original CKD assembly lines in Dong Feng. But Citroen's sales downturn was mainly 
caused by other factors. The local content of Citroen's ZX was as low as 25%, so the 
production cost and market price have been relatively high. Although Citroen appears 
to be facing an up-hill battle, with the support of its powerful partner Dong Feng it 
should be able to overcome its problems within the near future. 
13 
The Overall Market/ Industry 
Li4 (1993) and Shen5 (1993) studied the overall automobile industry in China. They 
posed a very positive point of view towards the passenger car industry, particularly 
during the time when the hype of the "family car" is over the whole country. They both 
noted that the country has to pick up the technology know-how from existing leading 
car producers so as to be self-contained in production, and be competitive to enter the 
world market. 
Harwit6 (1995) viewed the development of China's automobile industry from a policies 
and problems perspective. He illustrated the early pendulum-like policy swings of the 
1950s and 1960s, demonstrating contradiction between Maoist policies of grass-roots 
innovation and self-reliance, and the pragmatic forces preferring rational industrial 
development and use of foreign technology. Both sides, however, seemed to recognize 
the importance of a viable vehicle industry: the construction of production facilities, and 
resultant increases in automotive output over the decades, testify to this assertion. With 
Mao's death, those favoring foreign technology and investment, a rationalized 
production system, and meaningful passenger manufacture seem to have won the day. 
The precipitous advent of domestic vehicle demand reinforced the pragmatists' calls for 
such steps. There followed, then basic agreement on the ultimate goals for the 
automotive sector, even given the evidence of uneven progress in the vehicle industries 
of other developing nations. 
4 Li, Hung.，Chung-kuo Ch'i Ch'e Kung Yeh Ching Chi Fen His. Chung-kuo Jen Miu Ta Hs'ueh Ch'u 
Pan She: Ching Hsiao Che: Hsiu Hua Shu Tien Tsung Tien. Pei-ching Fa Hsing So, 1993. 
5 Shen, Jung., Chung-kuo Ch’i Ch'e Shih Ch'ang. Ching Chi K'o Hs'ueh Ch'u Pan She, 1993. 
6 Harwit, Eric., China's Automobile Industry - Policies, Problems, and Prospect. M.E. Sharpe, 1995. 
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However, concurrence on goals does not necessarily form the basis for coherent 
bureaucratic action. The post-Mao era fostered public debate and a divergence of 
opinion on the precise path China should take on the way to a healthy passenger car 
industry. It has also indicated that, by allowing foreigners a chance to participate in the 
country's automotive development, the Chinese had introduced a new element to the 
equation, one less subject to the central leadership's control. 
Harwit (1995) studied the cases of Beijing Jeep, Shanghai Volkswagen, Guangzhou 
Peugeot and Panda Motors that chronologically parallel the development of China's 
"open policy" to foreign investment from the end of 1970s to the early 1990s. In looking 
at the record of the foreign-invested passenger car industry, then, Harwit measured the 
progress of the relevant industrial bureaucratic sectors over the first fifteen years of 
reform. 
China seems to have made good progress in many of the goals set in the early 1980s. As 
compared with India's achievements in passenger car production over several decades, 
India was able to export some 11,000 cars and Jeeps over the one-year period from mid-
1986 to mid-1987. (The vast majority of the Indian vehicles, however, were sent to 
developing countries in Asia and Africa.) However, by mid-1990s, China's exports were 
still negligible. The Koreans were able to export some 179,000 cars and trucks, and sold 
about 80% of these vehicles to the United States, Canada, and Europe. In sum, the 
Chinese had made much faster progress than India, but still lagged behind the Koreans 
in both production and export capability. 
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Following an irrational proliferation of assembly and parts production plants in the 
1960s and 1970s, the reintroduction of sophisticated government planning personnel, 
and new cooperative schemes with foreign corporations, were meant to add order to the 
nation's manufacturing system. As decentralization of foreign investment practices 
increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, irrational approval of some projects began to 
pose a potential future problem in the automotive sector. Perhaps market forces, 
leavened by the increasing influence of technically educated bureaucratic experts, and of 
foreign-run joint venture managers, could bring order to the vehicle industry, and to 
other important areas of the national economy. Efforts by the China National 
Automotive Industrial Corporation (CNAIC) in the face of the GATT challenge show 
some evidence that a rational political policy may in fact, of necessity, be emerging. If it 
is not, China stands to see further bumps on its road to a modern, efficient, and 
rationally ordered automobile industry. 
Yang7 (1995) studied China, the United States as well as Japan in their globalization road 
of the automobile industry. In his terms, while the power of the world economy has 
shifted to the global corporations, the ability of the nations to pursue policies of their 
own choice has become dependent on their respective bargaining clout versus the 
globalization economy. The weaker a country is, the graver the pressure comes for it to 
bear the costs of policy adjustments required of global competition. In other words, the 
weak partners of global linkages are less able than their stronger counterparts to bargain 
terms for joining and maintaining linkages with global corporations. They must 
therefore exercise greater restraint in exhibiting ambivalence and contradictions in 
policy. 
7 Yang, Xiaohua., Globalization of Automobile Industry - The United States. Japan, and the People's 
Republic of China. Praeger, 1995. 
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China depends on global linkages to develop her auto industry. The state enterprises in 
this industry have thus come under severe pressure to adjust their structural relations, 
giving it good cause for ambivalence and contradictions towards the global linkages. As 
deliberated in Harwit (1995), China managed its command economy by periodically 
shifting the locus of policy making between the center and the provincial governments 
on the one hand, and between the center and the production units on the other from 
1949 to 1980. When flexibility in policy implementation was needed for the policy of the 
center to suit local conditions, the central planners in Beijing would decentralize 
decision-making power to the provinces and/or factories. But when decentralization led 
to "cellularised" local production and trade, contrary to the objective of developing 
inter-regional specialization of production, economy of scale, and comparative 
advantages of resources, they would take back the policy-making autonomy, resulting 
in cyclical shifts in reforms. The development of China's auto industry and the 
structural relations resulting from it reflect the effect of these policy shifts. 
For an emerging economy like China that wants to promote linkages with the global 
economy, an important question remains how much it is prepared to redraw inter-firm 
relationships in order to achieve the objective of technology transfer. Although global 
linkages demand significant organizational change in all societies, emerging economies 
like China are at a much greater disadvantage, having less capacity to resist the 
demands for such change. Such societies do not possess the technological bargaining 
power to form a strategic alliance and run against the "technonationlism" of the 
advanced industrial societies. 
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China is moving from the historical ideal fixed relationship under government 
assignment relations in manufacture-supplier to the reduction of government 
administrative barriers in supplies under globalization. And the vast potential market 
continues to lure the European, American and Japanese auto companies increasingly to 




Demand Not Encouraging 
There is a large misconception about the automotive market in China. Most people 
seem to believe it is growing - and rapidly. It did, for a while, but the growth has 
slowed. Between the end of 1993 and 1996 the market for vehicles as a whole grew at an 
average rate of just 1.7% a year, slower than Germany or Japan. The market for cars 
actually shrank. Perhaps worse, with tighter government controls to reduce inflation 
and cut vehicle imports, demand is not expected to grow much for some time. A 
substantial increase in private purchases is the only opportunity for major development 
of the car market. This depends, in turn, on the emergence of a large middle class in 
China. Even when the class is ready, with the general valuing system of the Chinese, it 
is better to get hold of a home (real estate) before buying a car. 
Impact of WTO Membership 
In recent years China has been very active in trying to obtain resumption of its 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although the exact timing of re-
entry is now hard to predict, this has put a tremendous pressure on China's automotive 
industry, which is inevitably faced with the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
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This heavily protected industry will be exposed to the much more advanced Western 
competition sooner, rather than later. Although after admission by WTO China will be 
allowed to continue protecting its infant automotive industry for a period of five to eight 
years, many of the local vehicle producers and components suppliers are now obliged 
seriously to consider, perhaps the first time, their chances of survival. The governments, 
both central and local, have also been under formidable pressure, mainly for political 
reasons (employment). 
Neglected Components Sector 
The auto components sector was much neglected in China, even when the country 
opened its door to Western automotive manufacturers. Most of the joint ventures with 
Western car makers started with assembly of imported CKD or SKD units, without 
generating the demand for qualified local components suppliers. The underdeveloped 
sector has been characterized by fragmentation with poor efficiency and low economies 
of scale (it has about 5,000 producers with 1 million employees), low product quality, 
low levels of technology and low levels of investment. Until early 1994, the total 
investment in the components sector only accounted for 15 - 20 % of the total 
investment in the whole automotive industry. 
Aftermarket Is In Disorder 
China's automotive after-sales market has been in disorder and is notorious for poor 
quality and imitation products. Thousands of small components makers in China 
supply to automotive garages and maintenance centers, competing only on price, while 
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quality is not an issue at this level. Most of the OEM suppliers are not in a position to 
compete in the after-sales market with those small makers who tend to sacrifice quality 
to reduce costs, since the repair shops (many of them are small and privately owned) 
depend on related margins. Furthermore, qualified producers find it difficult to protect 
themselves from a growing number of imitators in the after-sales market. It will take 
some time - perhaps two to four years - before a more orderly after-sales market will be 
established as the maintenance industry starts taking a longer-term view of the 
business. 
Policy Loopholes/Conflicts 
China is a huge country with complicated bureaucratic structures inherited from the old 
political system. As a result, the implementation of the national industrial policy has 
inevitably been complicated. The most obvious conflict occurred with urban traffic 
administration. The end of 1995 saw a sudden surge in private purchases of vehicles in 
Beijing, which had been triggered by a rumor that municipal authorities would start, at 
the beginning of 1996, to charge a "road overload fee". This did not materialize, but the 
authorities took another controversial measure in mid-February 1996. Several types of 
vehicles (such as cars with engines smaller than 1 liter, jeeps and mini-vans) are now 
forbidden to drive downtown on certain days of the week. Both the owners - especially 
those who bought the smaller vehicles in the panic at the end of 1995 - and the vehicle 




There exist different interests and considerations between the central and local 
governments. On one hand, the central government concentrates on the long-term 
strategic objectives for the development of China's automotive industry; on the other 
hand, local governments are very well aware that the automotive industry can play a 
key role in achieving local economic prosperity and political stability (by providing 
jobs), and then tend to fight for their local objectives by circumventing or simply 
ignoring central policies. 
One example is that automobile makers are often under political pressure from the local 
government to purchase components from local suppliers who are not competitive, 
either in terms of cost or quality. Another example of local protectionism is that a 
number of city governments have made the decision to exclude certain models of 
passenger cars from the city's taxi fleets. For instance, Shanghai Municipality ruled that 
all passengers cars, with engine displacement below 1.6 liters, were not allowed to be 
used by taxi companies in Shanghai, thus favoring the locally produced Santana; and 
Guangzhou had once announced that its taxi companies can only purchase Peugeot 
models for their fleets. 
Smuggling 
Automobile smuggling is still rampant in China despite enhanced controls by the 
government. According to Chinese custom statistics, China imported 8,984 motor 
vehicles (including KD) from Japan in the first half of 1996. According to Japanese 
statistics, however, Japan exported 20,000 motor vehicles (KD not included) in this 
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period. Another serious problem is smuggling of components for illegal assembly by 
some small repair shops or small converter plants. 1995 saw a lot of this kind of "gray 
vehicles" illegally being assembled and sold in China. According to an official estimate, 
there were several thousands gray Audi V6 models sold in China, priced at only RMB 
300,000 - 400,000, as compared with RMB 600,000 for the legal Audi V6 made by FAW-
Volkswagen. These kinds of gray vehicles have not only greatly disturbed the domestic 
industry and market, but also typically have serious safety problems. Sources said this 
contributed to the "death" of Guangzhou Peugeot. 
Debt Default Dilemma 
Most of the industrial companies in China have been haunted by debt problems for 
years. Although the central government has tried every means to solve the nationwide 
debt default problem, until now there has been no obvious improvement. The year 1996 
continues to be a very difficult year for domestic industries, especially for the 
automotive industry. According to statistics from China's banks' information network, 
the total debts of 26 major domestic vehicle makers (including eight major car makers) 
reached RMB 25.6 billion at end of June 1995 (including RMB 14.1 billion of receivables 
and RMB 11.5 billion of payables). In February 1996 the press reported how 100,000 
employees of First Automotive Works (FAW), the biggest auto maker in China, were 
mobilized to lend their private savings and disposable money to the company, which 
encountered serious cash-flow problems around the beginning of this year. Even if the 
local companies can temporarily secure some working capital from banks, the 
government, or its employees, they are confronted with the dilemma that the money 
will disappear into the "default trap" sooner or later. 
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Given very ambitious development goals, the need for capital is enormous. The official 
requirement for substantial Chinese ownership in the joint-venture projects puts a 




AND VALUE TO THE FOREIGN INVESTORS 
In China, the passenger car industry appears to be very promising. Beijing government 
is very committed to the industry. The Ministry of Machinery Industry projected that by 
year 2000 the sales of passenger car would be 1 million. 
As a general fact sheet of China's passenger car industry :-
Stage of production life cycle Low technology 
Number of global competitors Many, the major ones being the U.S, 
Japan, Germany, France, the U.K., 
Korea, Italy, Spain and Canada 
Number of region-wide competitors 8 
Number of national or local competitors 8 
(now 7 with the withdrawal of Peugeot) 
Percentage of country production (in the Negligible 
industry) exported 
Percentage of country consumption Low according to government statistics 
imported 
Local content requirement 40% - 60% 
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Labor cost Low 
Government share of customer purchases High 
Tax rate for local and for foreign Favorable tax rate 
companies ‘ 
Percentage foreign ownership allowed 50% 
While assessing the globalization potential drivers of the China passenger car industry , 
the market drivers projected a very optimistic picture. The cost drivers appears to be 
positive but does not apply to everybody in the industry. On the other hand, the 
competitor drivers, and especially the government drivers painted a more pessimistic 
picture and posts reasons for caution. 
Market 
The common customer needs are high. In China, the focus is mainly on unchangeable 
needs. There are around 10 passenger car models in China only. Transferable marketing 
can be applied in China. Except for purely locally designed models that have very 
limited presence, there are no passenger car model especially designed for the China 
market. The passenger car designs and models are "used" models in the lead countries 
(Germany, the United States, France, Japan) ten to twenty years ago. Even for the 
product names like Santana, Peugeot and Audi, most of them are direct translation into 
Chinese brand. 
There is complication with the pricing in the marketing mix. Although stated in the 
industrial policy in 1994, vehicle manufacturers have discretion to price their own 
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products in response to market demand, Beijing government has also set the pricing 
policy of passenger cars on 20th September, 1994. According to the policy, price 
fluctuation can only be within 10% of the factory price. In such a case, passenger car 
manufacturers have to adjust the factory price accordingly to guarantee sale of their 
brands in the market. 
The passenger cars are mainly for local consumption, exports is negligible. Therefore, 
there does not exist national global customers, multi-national global customers or global 
channels. 
Clearly the market globalization driver is giving China the best edge so far. To the 
foreign investors, it is also where the value of China lies. However, attention must be 
drawn to the fact that people view the short-term growth of the China passenger market 
is expected to be much slower than government projections suggest. The expected boom 
in demand is obviously delayed to somewhere between three and five years from now. 
In many ways the motor industry has become obsessed with China. It seems sure that 
the market will boost sales just as they are flagging elsewhere. With high economic 
growth rates and low vehicle penetration, China is held up as the "fastest-growing 
market in the world". For a few years in the early 1990s this was true, but since then the 
growth has slowed. Since the start of 1994 vehicle sales in Germany and even Japan 
have grown faster than those in China. New car sales in China were actually higher in 
1993 than they were in 1996. An estimated 1.5m motor vehicles were sold in 1996. While 
this was 1.9% more than in 1995, it was only 72,000 units more than three years before. 
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With the fall in imports, production has fared better although, even here, the average 
annual increase in the last three years is under 4%. 
The value to the auto makers will therefore lie in the long term potential of the market. 
It is no doubt that China inevitably will become one of the major vehicle producers in 
the world, and China's market does have enormous potential. 
Cost 
The cost drivers are not very favorable. The product development costs are low in 
China. Basically, the passenger car players are producing "used" models ten to twenty 
years ago like the Santana and the Jetta. Not until lately that initiatives are there to 
produce Civic and Corolla starting in 1999. Both Civic and Corolla are already very 
mature models currently and again, will be "used" models by 1999. 
The auto production technology is ten to twenty years behind the developed country8, 
and technology is not changing fast in the China automobile industry either. The 
percentage of technical staff is only 13% in 1993 and 12% in 1994. According to 
industrial policy, a Sino-foreign Car making Joint Venture must have an Research and 
Development setup, and should have the capacity to develop a new product generation 
within six years. 
Sourclng efficiency and logistics are not very favorable in China. The components 
industry has been in disorder. Thousands of small components makers in China supply 
8 Shen, Jung., Chung-kuo Ch'I Ch'e Shih Ch'ang., plOl _ 102. 
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to automotive garages and maintenance centers, competing only on price, while quality 
is not an issue at this level. Most of the OEM suppliers are not in a position to compete 
in the after-sales market with those small makers who tend to sacrifice quality to reduce 
costs, since the repair shops depend on related margins. Furthermore, qualified 
producers find it difficult to protect themselves from a growing number of imitators in 
the after-sales market. The car distribution system in China is very primitive. It is not 
rare that a newly bought car will have to be distributed to the buyer by driving it all the 
way there, which could already has 4,000 km on the clock and a full ashtray. 
The worst is, the production facilities are not enjoying economies of scale. There are too 
many factories producing the same products and none has achieved the economies of 
scale. This presents a sharp contrast to what is happening abroad, where there is a great 
concentration of production, with fewer manufacturers but much bigger output. In 1995, 
China turned out 1.45 million motor vehicles made by more than 120 auto companies 
and plants. But there are only two enterprises - the China First Automobile Corporation 
Group and the Dong Feng Motor Corporation attained economies of scale in production 
of medium-duty trucks. In comparison with foreign countries, in 1994, the combined 
production of three auto companies of the United States was 9.87 million units, that of 
seven Japanese companies was 10.11 million units, the total output of three auto 
German companies was 4.27 million units, and that of one Italian company was 1.5 
million units.9 
In addition, China's automobile enterprises are still weak in strength and production 
scale and organization, lagging far behind world advanced level. For example, among 
the top 500 industrial enterprises in the world in 1993, 159 were from the United States, 
9 Xinhua News Agency - CEIS，12 June, 1996 
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135 from Japan, 41 from Britain, 32 from Germany, 26 from France, 12 from the Republic 
of Korea, seven from Italy and only one from China which is in Taiwan. There were 58 
machine-building and 17 automobile enterprises listed among the top 500 Chinese 
industrial enterprises in 1993. They generated total sales volume topping RMB 182.4 
billion, only one-sixth of the sales volume of the U.S. General Motors Corporation. The 
17 automobile enterprises generated a combined sales volume of RMB 111.9 billion 
(about 14 billion US Dollars) in 1993 as against 133.6 billion US Dollars by the GM and 
13.7 billion US Dollars by Japan's Isuzu.10 
To the foreign investors, they all could enjoy cost benefits by applying "used" 
technology and tapping the low cost of labor in China. Yet since demand is not that 
blooming for everybody, the true winner will be those who could also enjoy the 
economies of scale in production. 
Competitor 
The competition situation in China is in a "controlled competition" environment. And 
among the players, competition is heated. All the Joint Ventures have to be approved at 
state level on a 50% owned by Chinese and 50% owned by foreign investor basis. There 
are other foreign companies waiting to join the passenger car industry. For instance, 
Toyota with Tianjin Automotive Industry (150,000 engine production plan approved 
already), Honda with Dong Feng Motor (key components production for 150,000 cars), 
and Opel with Guangzhou Automotive Industry (225,000). Beijing Jeep (Chrysler) has 
also been very active in lobbying for its new car project in addition to its Cherokee lines. 
10 Xinhua News Agency _ CEIS, 12 June, 1996 
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With all the infrastructure ready, these initiatives can easily be turned to assembly 
operation within a very short time frame and join the passenger car competition. 
The current foreign partners of the joint ventures - Germany, France, the United States, 
Japan • in China all ranked top in the world wide passenger car production (Table 5) 
and sales (Table 6). 
Table 5. Leading passenger car production countries (units'000) 
Rank 1994 Production 1993 Production 1992~ Production 
unit unit urdt 
1 Japan 7,801 Japan 8,494 Japan 9,379 
~2 IJS. 6,616 l i s ! 5,981 IJS. 5,864 
3 Germany 4,094 Germany 3,754 Germany 4,864 
~4 France 3,175 France 3,329 France 3,329 ^ ^ 
~5 Spain 1,822 Korea 1,593 Spain 1,791 
~6 Korea 1,806 Spain 1,506 Italy 1,477 
~7 ILK. 1,467 IIK. 1,376 Korea 1,307 
~8 Italy 1,341 Canada 1,353 UK 1,292 
~9 Brazil 1,249 Italy 1,117 CIS 1,053 ‘ 
"lO Canada 1,216 CIS 1,065 Canada 1,028 
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Table 6. Leading passenger car sales countries (units'000) 
1994 ~ 1994 1 9 9 3 ~ : ~ Growth ( % ) ~ � 
U.S. 8,990 8,406 一 6.9 
Japan 4,210 4,190 05 
Germany3 ,209 3,194 05 
France 1,973 1,721 146 
U.K. 1,911 1,778 73 
Korea 1,789 1,610 i l l 
Italy 1,647 1,890 
Spain 908 745 2L9 
Canada 749 736 L8 
Of the four key countries, Germany is the first to come and is so far the best performer. 
The Japanese is the latest to come. Export of the passenger cars from China is negligible. 
The record is 2,866 passengers export in 1993, comparing to Japan's export units of 
almost 4 million in the same year. Imports of passenger in 1993 is 111,059 units and in 
1994 135,580 units. This has not taken into account parallel import, smuggling and gray 
cars. 
For investors in the industry, China is not an easy place to do business. Regulations, 
bureaucracy and official corruption are an irritation. Power shortages, congestion and 
inadequate road network are also a headache. In the auto industry especially, there is a 
very underdeveloped sales, service and distribution network. There are currency risks, 
labor problems and quality differences. But the biggest difficulty of all is joint-venture 
partners. These can bring undreamed of problems and setbacks - partly as a result of 
cultural differences. There are numerous horror stories of Western and Japanese vehicle 
manufacturers trying to enter the market, and few have happy endings. Of all those 
trying to break in, only Volkswagen has so far triumphed. Even here, though, there are 
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events that are not discussed. Like the suicide of the managing director of Shanghai 
Volkswagen, Fang Hong, in 1993 amid suggestions of a financial scandal. Just before his 
death he had received a visit from the Ministry of State Security. And, in 1992, two 
executives from the company's public relations office were imprisoned for corruption. 
There have been problems in the north too, with First Automotive Group (FAG) 
withholding payments to Volkswagen, often for months at a time. 
Government 
Beijing government plays a very influential role. Tariff is extremely high of up to 230% 
import duties. Import duties is unlikely to fall. Import duties fell in 1994 and many 
expected them to fall further in 1996. However, China's failure to rejoin the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its stated policy of protecting its domestic 
industry make it unlikely to fall further in the short term. Even the lure of becoming 
part of GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), is unlikely to 
encourage the government to reduce its tariff. In 1996, passenger car imports incurred 
tariffs between 110% and 230% depending on the engine size and the country of origin. 
(Table 7) 
Table 7. Duties on imported passenger cars and locally assembled vehicle kits, 
1996 
Most favored nations (%) Others (%) 
Up to 2500cc (diesel 110 230 
Up to 2200cc (petrol) 150 230 
Over 2200cc (petrol) 150 230 
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In terms of subsidies, joint venture companies producing passenger cars will enjoy 
favorable import tax rates when they match the requirement of the localization 
progressions schedule. This schedule is also kind of non-tariff barriers. The local content 
must reach 40% within 3 years and 60% within 5 years. 
Although the state encourage private household to purchase vehicles, the percentage of 
car owned by private household is low. In the sales of Santana in 1993 and 1994, the 
percentage owned by private household are only 5.5% and 7.3% respectively. 
The fascination and the desperation have blinded foreign investors to the political risk -
tight, fast changing, pendulum like, conflicting policies. All of these are bad enough, but 
there is one final, far more important. One wonders whether Jiang Zamen is able to 
bond the parties together after Deng's death. 
They realize that the country is not moving boldly towards a free market. It is still very 
much a communist state, albeit with some laissez-faire additions. It is still uneasy about 
foreign investors and their ambitions. Unlike India, it will not submit to a form of 
economic colonialism, where foreign firms control its destiny. China is not another 
South-east Asian tiger for the automotive industry to exploit. It is a dragon and many 
fingers will get burnt, like the case of Peugeot. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION 
Obviously the least thing the Beijing government wants to see is her passenger car 
industry following the footstep of Indonesia where the "national car" scheme has been a 
disaster. Fewer than half of the Timor sedans have been sold; the rest are parked at 
Jakarta airport11. 
In view of the current situation, the possible areas that the Beijing government could 
consider to promote her value to the passenger car makers while still protecting her 
infant industry are as follows :-
Facilitate Consolidation 
In 1995 there were more than 120 vehicle manufacturers in China and consolidation is 
badly needed if the sector is to benefit from economies of scale. The government's 
blueprint is to accelerate the natural process of rationalization in the industry over the 
next few years to create a few large and strong suppliers. The automotive industry in 
China will continue to undergo a massive reorganization over the next decade. This will 
involve greater investment in components and facilities, and a rationalization of the 
number of vehicle manufacturers. 
11 "Shaking the family tree". Asian Business. Vol 33 No 2 February 1997. p 28 - 32. 
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The government should consider encouraging mergers among the existing large 
manufacturers. Those with potential be kept while the rest the government should 
consider letting them absorbed by bigger corporations or simply let them die on the 
road. 
The government should consider allowing no further foreign automobile companies to 
set up joint ventures as this would only lead to an increase in over-capacity. Existing 
plants should be allowed to increase capacity by introducing new technology or modern 
car lines. 
The Beijing government should also be aware of component parts development. In 1994 
the Chinese government announced that it would not permit any new foreign 
passenger car ventures until 1996. This was to allow the local industry to develop a 
consolidation. Any manufacturer wanting to enter after 1996 was to start with a 40% 
local content and increase this to 60% in three years. Because of the restrictions in the 
last few years many potential investors have been advised to focus on components or 
commercial vehicles. As a result Ford, General Motors, Renault, Nissan, Honda and 
Daewoo have all set up ventures in light commercial vehicles or components. They have 
not hidden their true ambitions to establish assembly operations, however, and have 
been warned that they should take care. The official China Daily has said that a close 
watch will be kept over all new components operations because "such projects can be 
developed into car assembly plants in a short time". 
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Promoting Long-term Market Hype 
A popular idea is that China is a huge opportunity for foreign vehicle manufacturers. 
Many think the market is competitively fragmented, that the products are 
technologically backward and that the society is moving boldly towards a free market. It 
should, therefore, be an easy place to penetrate. Yet, despite these ideas, many find that 
it is not. Almost all of the world's vehicle manufacturers have tried to gain entry. Not 
many go on with a happy ending. 
The Beijing government should continue to project such a "misconception", promoting 
the standalone attractiveness of China's passenger car in terms of its market size, 
expected growth rate, long term economic promising outlook, little cost of adaptation, 
political stability (removal of the biggest variable after Deng Xiaoping's passing away) 
and favorable tax rate. 
The "family car" exercise has proved to be very successful. The government should 
consider to continue marketing and propaganda activities, giving updates to the car 
markers on a regular basis, clearing the "guess" that the project has died. 
Building Faith in the Beijing Government 
China has always been viewed as a country ruled by "man" instead of by "law" by the 
western world. The Beijing government should consider promoting faith in her by first 
promoting stability after Deng, that Jiang Zamen is in control. Another consideration 
could be the putting of importance on key personnel linked to the industry as seen by 
the foreign investors such as Zhu Ronji. 
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The Beijing government would have less to do on the protection front (both tariff and 
non-tariff), which is the area most probably she has to relax taking into account her 
determination to join the World Trade Organization sooner or later. She has to take the 
time left preparing the industry to face international competition before it is too late. In 
reality, however, many of the less competitive local companies will either cease to exist 
or be forced to merge with the bigger players. 
The government should release clear and reliable guidelines on the measure to be 
imposed in the near future as well as the long term strategy for the industry. This will 
lead to the foreign investors give more faith in the Chinese government. 
Policy adjustments against foreign investor cannot be totally autarkic as long as China's 
national economy is increasingly being linked with the global economy. China has had 
to minimize the decentralizing effects on the interests of the foreign investors and heed 
their demands when it amends the join venture laws so as to prevent the amendment 
from driving them away. It has also had to introduce some changes in domestic 
economic system to maintain and expand global linkages. 
50/50 
To continue the control, by continuing the 50/50 game - 50% ownership by Chinese 
body and 50% ownership by foreign investor policy. This will continue to loop the 
foreign partner in that the two parties are doing good and bad together. In local terms 




In conducting the study on the selected topic, there are several limitations that worth 
notice. 
Firstly, the data from the secondary research are mainly from statistics from China, such 
as the Automobile Industry yearbook. However, discrepancy are noted. Take for 
instance, according to Chinese custom statistics, China imported 8,984 motor vehicles 
(including KD) from Japan in the first half of 1996. According to Japanese statistics, 
however, Japan exported 20,000 motor vehicles (KD not included) in this period. Some 
of the statistics are therefore questionable. 
Secondly, there have been great changes in the industry and is therefore difficult to keep 
track on the most up-dated changes. For example, when the study was carried out, 
there are eight key players in the passenger car industry in China. Lately, however, the 
foreign partner in the Guangzhou-Peugeot withdrew from the joint venture. Therefore, 
there is no way to assess in depth the impact of this change in such a short period of 
time. 
Finally, as per discussion, government policy is playing an important role and the views 
of related government officials would be precious contribution to the study. However, 
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Major points of the 1994 industrial policy : 
1. By the turn of the century, the state will support two or three automobile makers or 
enterprise groups (domestic market share of the three giants should total about 
70%), and support six to seven auto manufacturers or groups to become "backbone" 
enterprises. On this basis, the state will continuously encourage mergers among 
these major players with the goal of establishing three to four internationally 
competitive automotive groups by 2010. 
2. New investment in passenger car production will be limited to the eight leading 
manufacturers and no new projects will be approved until the start of the Ninth 
Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). 
3. The minimum production scale for a manufacturer to obtain support from the state 
in doubling its output is 100,000 units per year. 
4. For new projects (including join ventures) manufacturing passenger cars with 
engines under 1600cc, the minimum production scale is 150,000 units per year 
A Sino-foreign car making joint venture must meet the following requirements: 
1. An R&D department must be set up in the joint venture, which should have the 
capacity to develop a new product generation within six years; 
2. The products must be of international standards and of the 1990s in terms of their 
technology levels; 
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3. Foreign exchange balance should be achieved for the joint venture largely by 
exporting its own products or other products it has purchased in the domestic 
market; 
4. The joint-venture agreement should not include any clause that stipulates any 
regional restrictions on sales of the products; 
5. The joint venture should have discretion to decide on the use of locally made parts 
and components; i 
6. In the case of a joint venture producing complete vehicles or engines, the share of 
the Chinese party should not be less than 50%； 
7. Joint-venture companies producing passenger cars will enjoy favorable import tax 
rates when they meet the requirements of the localization progress schedule; the 
local content level must reach 40% within three years, and 60% within five years; 
8. The state encourages private households to purchase vehicles; and 
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